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Inframarginal economics is a combination of marginal and total cost-benefit analysis (across corner 
solutions). It has been applied extensively in analysing trade issues, however, there have been few 
environmental applications. While there is debate over the contribution of inframarginal economics to 
the analysis of aggregate economic phenomena, inframarginal economics is central to understanding 
agent-level decisions. 
This paper applies inframarginal methods to investigate the efficient allocation of water among 
ecosystems. The Australian Government is acquiring billions of dollars of water for environmental uses 
through a number of programs. Allocating this water efficiently will require information on preferences 
and environmental production functions, as well as the development of analytical frameworks capable 
of examining corner solutions. 
Within a general inframarginal framework, this paper investigates the conditions under which corner 
solutions are likely to be efficient. In particular, corner solutions may arise when environmental 
production functions are convex but are also possible under ‘well behaved’ functions.
Introduction
The ecological health of many of Australia's river systems has declined over time. The 
regulation of rivers and diversions for agriculture and other uses have changed flow regimes, 
affecting floodplain and instream habitats. According to Arthington and Pusey (2003), around 
90 per cent of floodplain wetlands in the Murray-Darling Basin no longer exist. In New South 
Wales, around 50 per cent of coastal wetlands have been lost, while around 75 per cent of 
wetlands on the Swan Coastal Plain of Western Australia have also been lost. These changes 
in habitat have contributed to a decline in native fish and bird populations in some areas 
(Davies et al. 2008; Gehrke et al. 2003; Harris and Gehrke 1997; Kingsford 2000; Kingsford 
and Thomas 1995). In the Murray-Darling Basin, approximately half of native fish species are 
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2considered threatened, while common carp was the dominant species in Sustainable River 
Audit surveys, accounting for 58 per cent of total fish biomass (Davies et al. 2008). 
Additional water and other resources will probably have to be allocated to environmental uses 
if the declining health of many of Australia's river systems is to be slowed or reversed. This 
could happen a number of ways. In Australia, most environmental water is allocated by 
governments. In the Murray-Darling Basin, a central government agency – the Murray-
Darling Basin Authority – is responsible for determining how much water to allocate to 
thousands of ecosystems across the Basin. Some or all of this water will be sourced through a 
$3.1 billion plan to buy water rights from irrigators and $5.8 billion of investment in water 
infrastructure projects. Economists have also examined the potential for decentralised public 
systems where public water could be sourced and managed by local water trusts or public 
land and river managers (PC 2010, Young 2010). Finally, there could be some role for the 
private sector (individuals, charities and businesses) in restoring degraded river systems, as is 
common in the western United States.
There are two primary motivations for developing an analytical framework to investigate 
efficient  environmental water allocation decisions. First, understanding the nature of the 
allocation problem makes it easier to assess which system, or mix of systems, is most likely to 
resolve the allocation problem. Second, irrespective of the system adopted, understanding the 
allocation problem should lead to more efficient environmental allocation decisions and better 
outcomes for the community. 
What does the literature say about the allocation of environmental water? (The allocation of 
other resources will not be considered.) According to the Productivity Commission's Water 
Buyback study, 'the efficient allocation of water resources occurs when the marginal net 
benefits of water are equated across all uses, including consumptive and environmental uses' 
(PC 2010, p.61). This is similar to the definitions set out in introductory environmental 
economics textbooks, and is most easily demonstrated with a simple diagram. Figure 1 
examines the allocation of a given bundle of water between two ecosystems. The volume of 
water available is given by the distance between the left vertical axis and the right vertical 
axis. The marginal net benefit of watering ecosystem A is given by MBa, which should be 
interpreted left-to-right (from the left vertical axis). The marginal net benefit of watering 
ecosystem B is given by MBb, which should be interpreted right-to-left (from the right 
vertical axis). 
3In the case drawn in PC (2010), both marginal net benefit curves are downward sloping and 
intersect between the vertical axes and above the horizontal axis. Under these conditions, and 
in the absence of other complications, the marginal approach gives the efficient allocation of 
water, and some water is allocated to both ecosystems. But what happens, for example, if the 
marginal net benefit curves are upward sloping or they do not intersect between the vertical 
axes? In this case, the marginal solution either does not exist or represents the least beneficial 
allocation of environmental water, and efficiency requires that some ecosystems receive no 
water. 
Figure 1: a valid marginal solution in the allocation of environmental water
The inframarginal approach proposed below provides a solution to these problems but does 
introduce additional complexities, and hence, it is reasonable to consider whether the 
marginal approach is likely to represent a good approximation of the underlying problem. 
There are a number of ways of considering this. One approach is to examine the 
environmental production functions (which show the relationship between inputs, such as 
water, and environmental outputs). The environmental benefit functions estimated by Horne 
et al. (2009) (for river flow on the Goulburn River in Victoria) have upward sloping segments 
and other complexities that could render marginal analysis insufficient (figure 2). Indeed, 
these empirically-derived curves look very different to the 'textbook style' curves in figure 1.
An alternative way to assess the applicability of the marginal approach is to consider whether 
the implication — that it would be efficient to water all 30 000 environmental assets in the 
Murray-Darling Basin — is reasonable. It is unlikely that any economist would find such a 
conclusion credible. Indeed, some economists have recognised the necessity to prioritise 
4environmental water allocations by not applying water to some wetlands and riparian forests 
(sometimes known as 'triage' decisions). As such, it is likely to be important to use an 
analytical framework that allows for some ecosystems to go without water. 
Figure 2: an example of an empirically-derived marginal benefit curve
Source: Horne et al. 2009.
Goddard et al. (2009) introduce such a framework in a dynamic programming model with 
stochastic rainfall. Like the model discussed above, the authors examine the allocation of 
water between two ecosystems. In addition, water can be held in storage, introducing a 
marginal user cost. The ecosystems have fixed water requirements, and need to be watered at 
least every five years or suffer irreversible damage. Goddard et al. (2009) calculate the 
optimal management rule based on hypothetical data and find that it is sometimes efficient to 
water only one ecosystem, retaining more water in storage, even when there is sufficient 
water to keep both ecosystems healthy in the short run. This strategy increases the probability 
of the watered ecosystem surviving, but reduces the probability of the other ecosystem 
surviving. The simplified environmental production functions used in Goddard et al. (2009) 
do not allow for a marginal solution (although it can generate interior solutions where both 
ecosystems receive water) or corner solutions caused by convexities in the production 
functions. Thus, while Goddard et al. (2009) provides a valuable example illustrating one 
possible cause of corner solutions, the task of developing a more general framework remains. 
This paper attempts this task, illustrating the framework using quadratic production functions. 
In doing so, it draws heavily on inframarginal economics, especially Cheng et al. (2000). 
Inframarginal economics applies non-classical mathematical programming techniques to 
solve problems that might have corner solutions. It has been applied most extensively to 
examine specialisation in the context of international trade. Cheng et al. (2000) develops a 
simple Ricardian trade model which examines countries' decisions regarding whether to 
produce two goods in an environment characterised by 'increasing returns' (notionally caused 
by learning costs) and exogenous comparative advantage. There are a number of possible 
5'market structures' from autarky at one extreme to complete specialisation at the other. In 
some respects this is similar to the problem at hand — with autarky corresponding to the case 
where both ecosystems are watered and specialisation corresponding to the case where only 
one ecosystem is watered. As a result, this paper adopts a broadly similar analytical approach 
to Cheng et al. (2000).
While the non-linear programming approach used below is entirely conventional, some of the 
applications of inframarginal economics have been criticised by Dixon (2006). Dixon’s main 
argument was that most problems can be adequately addressed with marginal analysis when 
analysed with sufficient aggregation. While this may, or may not, be the case for aggregate 
trade models (see Tombazos (2006) for counter arguments), the model developed in this paper 
examines decision making at a highly disaggregated level where corner solutions are certainly 
plausible. In this sense, the water allocation problem discussed below is more like Rosen 
(1978), which examines the division of labour within a firm.
Model and results
This section introduces a deterministic, single period environmental water allocation model. 
The model seeks to maximise returns,  P , by allocating a given bundle of water, W , between 
two ecosystems, A and B. 
Maximise:
( ) ( ) A B B B A A W W g P W W f P , , + = P (1)
Subject to:
W W W B A £ + (2)
0 , ³ B A W W (3)
where  A P  and  B P  are the values of a unit of output from ecosystems A and B (assumed to be 
constant), while  ( ) B A W W f ,  and  ( ) A B W W g ,  are twice differentiable environmental 
production functions that relate the volumes of water applied to ecosystems A and B,  A W  and 
B W , to environmental output. To illustrate technical interdependence between the 
ecosystems, the volume of water applied to one ecosystem is allowed to influence the output 
of the other ecosystem. This kind of interdependence could be a result of return flows or 
similar phenomena. 
6Configurations
In this model there are four possible configurations: (i) water both ecosystems, (ii) only water 
ecosystem A, (iii) only water ecosystem B, and (iv) water neither ecosystems. The water 
constraint is assumed to be binding. This rules out configuration (iv) and simplifies the 
analytics for the other configurations. 
First order conditions
This problem gives rise to the following Khun-Tucker conditions:
0 £ - + l WA B WA A g P f P ;  0 ³ A W ;  ( ) 0 = - + l WA B WA A A g P f P W ;
0 £ - + l WB A WB B f P g P ;  0 ³ B W ;  ( ) 0 = - + l WB A WB B B f P g P W ;
0 = - - B A W W W (4)
where  WA f ,  WA g , WB f  and  WB g  are the partial derivatives of  ( ) B A W W f ,  and  ( ) A B W W g ,  
with respect to  A W  and  B W , and  l  is the Lagrangian multiplier.
To examine the parameter subspace and solution values associated with different 
configurations a specific function form for the environmental production functions is 
assumed. For illustrative purposes, a quadratic relationship is assumed between the water 










2 1 0 5 . 5 . , A A A B B B A B W b W b W W b W b W b b W W g + + + + + = (5)
where  5 0 , , a a   and  5 0 , , b b   are parameters.
The first step is to evaluate:
• the conditions under which there is an interior stationary point, 
• the values of  A W  and  B W  associated with that point (if it exists), and 
• the conditions under which the corners are local maxima or minima. 
7Both  A W  and  B W  would exceed zero under any interior stationary point. Thus, the 
complementary slackness conditions in (4) imply that the marginal conditions would hold 
with strict equality and the problem reduces to the standard marginal problem:
0 = - + l WA B WA A g P f P
0 = - + l WB A WB B f P g P
0 = - - B A W W W (6)
Substituting in the partial derivatives of (5) and solving for the values of  A W  and  B W  
associated with the interior stationary point (if it exists):
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
D




3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 - + - - - + -
=
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
D




3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 - + - - - + -
= (7)
where
[ ] [ ] 5 2 3 5 2 3 2 2 b b b P a a a P D B A - - + - - = (8)
An interior stationary point exists when  0 > A X  and  0 > B X . D  can be either positive or 
negative. If  0 > D , the following conditions apply for an interior stationary point:
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - > - + -  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - > - + - (9)
On the other hand, the inequalities are reversed if  0 < D  and the following conditions apply:
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - < - + -  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - < - + - (10)
If (9) or (10) are satisfied, the stationary point will occur at  A A X W =  and  B B X W = .
8To identify the conditions under which the corners are local maxima or minima, the problem 
must be solved four times, as both a maximisation and minimisation problem at each corner. 
We will briefly examine the results for corner A (the conditions for corner B are 
symmetrical). The maximisation problem for the corner where only ecosystem A is watered is 
similar to (6) except that the second equation is characterised by a weak inequality.
0 = - + l WA B WA A g P f P
0 £ - + l WB A WB B f P g P
0 = - - B A W W W (11)
Watering only ecosystem A will be a local maximum when:
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - £ - + - (12)
To solve the corresponding minimisation problem some of the inequalities in (4) must be 
reversed. Watering only ecosystem A will be a local minimum when:
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - ³ - + - (13)
Second order conditions 
The second step is to evaluate:
• whether there is the potential for more than one stationary point, and
• the conditions under which the allocation problem is concave or convex.
One way of doing this is to examine the second order total differential of (1). 
2 2 2 2 B WBWB B A WAWB A WAWA dW h dW dW h dW h d + + = P (14)
where  WAWA h ,  WAWB h ,  WBWB h  are the second partial derivatives with respect to the variables 
A W  and  B W . If, as above, the water constraint is assumed to be binding, we can take the total 
differential of (2) and impose the following restriction on the relationship between  A dW  and 
B dW :
9B A dW dW - = (15)
Substituting (15) into (14):
( )
2 2 2 A WBWB WAWB WAWA dW h h h d + - = P (16)
Adopting the specific functional forms assumed in (1) and (5):
( ) ( ) [ ]
2
5 2 3 5 2 3
2 2 2 A B A dW b b b P a a a P d - - + - - - = P (17)
The terms inside the square brackets are equal to the denominator in (7) ( D ). The sign of 
P
2 d  does not depend on the values of  A W  and  B W . This means that it is not possible for 
there to be more than one stationary point. (17) also allows us to determine whether the 
problem is convex or concave. In particular, the problem will be concave when  0 > D  and 
convex when  0 < D .
Solutions
The third step is to identify all possible 'problem types', and then determine the parameter 
subspace and solution values associated with different configurations. There are four possible 
'problem types':
• Interior stationary point and      0 > D . The problem is concave, and hence the 
stationary point corresponds to a local maximum. Since there is only one stationary 
point, this must also be a global maximum. This is the only 'problem type' that results 
in an interior solution. It is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows  P  for different 
combinations of  A W  and  B W  that satisfy the water constraint. 
• Interior stationary point and      0 < D . The problem is convex, and hence the stationary 
point corresponds to a local minimum. Since there is only one stationary point, the 
global maximum associated with (10) must be a corner — more specifically, the 
corner with the higher value. In figure 4,  P  is higher at point c than point d and so 
the optimal strategy is to only water ecosystem A. Returning to the algebraic 
example, in the context of an interior stationary point being a minimum, it will be 
optimal to only water ecosystem water A when:
10( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) W b b P W a a P W b b P W a a P B A B A 2 1 5 4 5 4 2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 + + + > + + + (18)
and only water ecosystem B when:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) W b b P W a a P W b b P W a a P B A B A 2 1 5 4 5 4 2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 + + + < + + + (19). 
• One of the corners is a local maximum and      0 > D . The problem is concave, and the 
existence of a corner as a local maximum rules out the possibility of an interior 
stationary point (as it has been established that there are either zero or one stationary 
points). Hence, any feasible movement away from the corner which is the local 
maximum will reduce  P  and the that corner will also be a global maximum. This 
possibility is shown in figure 5 for the case where it is optimal to only water 
ecosystem A. 
• One of the corners is a local minimum and      0 < D . The problem is convex, and the 
existence of a corner as a local minimum rules out the possibility of an interior 
stationary point (as in the case above). Hence, any feasible movement away from the 
corner which is the local minimum will increase  P  and the opposite corner will be a 
global maximum. This possibility is shown in figure 6 for the case where it is optimal 
to only water ecosystem B. 
Figure 3: illustrative interior solution
11Figure 4: illustrative corner solution with interior stationary point
Figure 5: illustrative corner solution without interior stationary point,  0 > D
Figure 6: illustrative corner solution without interior stationary point,  0 < D
It is now possible to examine the parameter subspace and solution values associated with 
different configurations (table 1). 






0 > D ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - > - + -
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - > - + -
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
D




3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 *
- + - - - + -
=
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
D




3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 *
- + - - - + -
=
A only (ii) 0 > D ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - £ - + - W WA = * ;  0 * = B W
0 < D ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - < - + -
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - < - + -
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) W b b P W a a P W b b P W a a P B A B A 2 1 5 4 5 4 2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 + + + > + + +
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - ³ - + -
B only (iii) 0 > D ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - £ - + - W WB = * ;  0 * = A W
0 < D ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P B A - + - < - + -  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - < - + -
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) W b b P W a a P W b b P W a a P B A B A 2 1 5 4 5 4 2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 + + + < + + +
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 a a W a a P b b W b b P A B - + - ³ - + -
[ ] [ ] 5 2 3 5 2 3 2 2 b b b P a a a P D B A - - + - - =
13Comparative statics
We can investigate the relationship between the parameters and optimal allocations by taking 
the partial derivatives of  * A W  with respect to the parameters. The following equations 
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where
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 3 2 4 1 5 3 4 1 b b W b b P a a W a a P N B A - + - - - + - = (24)
This is because an increase in  1 a ,  2 a ,  4 b  or  5 b  increases the marginal benefits of applying 
water to ecosystem A at all levels. The relationship between  2 a  and  * A W  can be illustrated 
graphically for a given hypothetical set of parameters (figure 7; table 2). At values of 
6 . 0 2 - < a  the interior solution holds and water is allocated to both ecosystems. As expected, 
14an increase in  2 a  increases  * A W . The model shifts to a corner solution at  6 . 0 2 - = a  beyond 
which only ecosystem A is watered. 













a assumed parameter values given in table 2,  1 2 - = b
Setting  2 2 = b  changes the problem substantially (figure 8). In this case, the problem is 
convex and jumps discontinuously between the two corner solutions at  2 a  = 0.3. 













a assumed parameter values given in table 2,  2 2 = b















An increase in  1 b ,  2 b ,  4 a  and  5 a  increases the marginal benefits of applying water to 
ecosystem B. This increases the opportunity cost of watering ecosystem A, therefore reducing 
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W B A   (28)
16We now turn to the interaction terms,  3 a  and  3 b . Within the interior solution, an increase in 
3 a  and  3 b  increases  * A W  when more water is applied to ecosystem B than ecosystem A, 
and decreases  * A W  when more water is applied to ecosystem A than ecosystem B. This 
means that increases in  3 a  and  3 b  result in a more balanced allocation of water among the 
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Figure 9 shows that a decrease in  3 a  has the effect of increasing watering of the more highly 
watered ecosystem (within the interior solutions), which is ecosystem A in this example. It 
can also result in corner solutions. For example, at  2 . 1 2 3 - < < - a  it is optimal to only 
water ecosystem A. By contrast, at the limit as  ¥ ® 3 a ,  5 * ® A W  (a perfectly balanced 
allocation of water). 













a assumed parameter values given in table 2,  1 2 - = b
17The effect of  A P  and  B P  on  * A W  is ambiguous.
( ) [ ] [ ]
2
5 2 3 5 3 4 1 2 *
D










































 is negative (31)
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 will be positive when  0 > D  and 
0 > l , both of which are conditions for the interior solution described in table one. An 
increase in  A P  will increase  * A W  under these conditions. However, with the interaction 
terms it is possible that an increase in  A P  could reduce  * A W . This is because an increase in 
A P  could theoretically increase the marginal benefits of watering ecosystem B more than it 







 happens to be positive in 
figure 10. 
















a assumed parameter values given in table 2,  1 2 - = b
An increase in the volume of water available could have a positive or negative effect on  * A W .
( ) ( )
D
b b P a a P
W




























 is negative (33)





, the numerator of which is the negative of the slope of the marginal 
benefit curve associated with watering ecosystem B. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate these 
possibilities, with parameter values of  1 2 - = b  and  2 2 = b . In figure 11, the corner solution 
A prevails for  6 . 3 0 < < W , while the interior solution described in table one prevails for 
2 . 24 6 . 3 < < W . Since the numerator in (33) is positive, there is also a positive relationship 
between W  and  * A W  within the interior solution. 
19Figure 10 also illustrates a corner solution where it is efficient to only water ecosystem A for 
lower values of W , followed by an interior solution. However, the relationship between W  
and  * A W  is negative within the interior solution as the benefits at the margin of watering 
ecosystem B increase as more water becomes available (because of its convex production 
function). At values of W  in excess of 4.7 the other corner solution prevails and it is efficient 
to only water ecosystem B. 















a assumed parameter values given in table 2,  1 2 - = b












a assumed parameter values given in table 2,  2 2 = b
20Discussion
The analysis above demonstrates that corner solutions are a genuine theoretical possibility in 
a two ecosystem model. As a result, the responses of optimal water allocation to changes in 
parameters may not be smooth or continuous, even with quadratic environmental production 
functions. What can be reasonably concluded about the possibilities of corner solutions? First, 
corner solutions are possible, even when both environmental production functions are 
concave (as in figure 7). This is because the marginal net benefit of applying the first unit of 
water to one ecosystem could be less than the marginal net benefit associated with the last 
unit of water applied to the other ecosystem, even when the second ecosystem receives all 
available water. Hence, with concave environmental production functions, the interior 
solution only applies over a limited parameter subspace. In this setting, a corner solution is 
more likely the lower the interaction term (figure 9) and the smaller the overall volume of 
water available (figure 11). 
Second, corner solutions are assured when both environmental production functions are 
convex. (If one environmental production function is concave and the other is convex, the 
allocation problem could be either concave or convex depending on the magnitudes 
involved.) Where the problem is convex, the responses to changes in parameters can look 
very different. For example, there could be discontinuous jumps between corner solutions 
(figure 8). 
The model also presents some potentially counter-intuitive insights. For example, an increase 
in the price of output from an ecosystem could decrease the efficient production from that 
ecosystem, while an increase in the overall volume of water available could reduce the 
optimal quantity of water applied to an ecosystem (figure 12). Revealing the possibility of 
these counter-intuitive outcomes and deriving the conditions under which they will occur is 
an advantage of approaching the water allocation problem with a degree of formalism. 
This work has parallels with Kuosmanen and Laukkanen (2009), which employs a dynamic 
model to examine efficient abatement strategies where there are a number of interacting 
pollutants. Applying their model to eutrophication and climate change they conclude that ‘the 
optimal policy is often a corner solution, in which abatement is focused on a single pollutant’ 
and that ‘corner solutions may arise even in well-behaved problems with concave production 
functions’ (p. 1). Although their application is different, their approach and results have 
similarities. This suggests that the general framework outlined above is likely to apply a range 
21of environmental (and other economic) problems, and that the allocation of environmental 
water is one of many potential applications. 
Potential areas for future research include adding dynamics and uncertainty surrounding 
inflows and environmental responses; the ability to carryover water in storage; more than two 
ecosystems; and more realistic environmental production functions (with thresholds, and so 
on). Incorporating empirically-derived on ecological responses and preferences would also be 
worthwhile. 
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